Allegations of criminal conduct have been made against UN peacekeeping personnel. While only a small number commit criminal offences, these personnel must be held accountable for their actions. Ensuring accountability is difficult due to jurisdictional issues, including in which jurisdiction (host state, sending state, or third state) to prosecute offenders. However, the possibility of the International Criminal Court exercising jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel (civilian or military) has not really been considered. This article will examine the potential applicability of the substantive law of war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute to crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel.
Introduction
Accountability of peacekeeping personnel for crimes committed whilst on mission is something that the UN has been struggling with in recent years. Allegations of misconduct amounting to criminal behaviour have increased awareness of the problem.
Misconduct has included sexual exploitation and abuse, weapons trading, and gold smuggling.
1 Progress has been made in developing the UN's administrative investigative (Plaut, 2008) .
3 and non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports demonstrate the number of offences committed by peacekeepers is far greater than these few prosecutions. For example, various NGOs have reported allegations of many cases of crimes including human trafficking, protection of brothel owners from raids, and sexual slavery, including of girls (Vandenberg, 2002; Amnesty International, 2004b; Mendelson, 2005 ; Save the Children, 2006 ). The Secretary-General's reports on sexual exploitation and abuse show that allegations of criminal conduct including rape, sexual assault, and sex with minors reached as high as 357 in 2006, and still 85 allegations in 2010. 9 These reports indicate that of the cases referred to states, few states respond to the referrals, and those that do rarely result in disciplinary action. It is also unclear from the UN reports what disciplinary action is taken, including whether or not prosecutions are held for criminal conduct. 10 Due to the lack of transparency in these reports, and the lack of willingness of the UN to provide the public with details of allegations referred, it is not possible to follow up these referrals to determine the outcome. In addition to the ongoing problem of sexual exploitation and abuse, there have been reports of crimes such as corruption, gold smuggling and supplying weapons to disarmed rebels (Lynch, 2001; Plaut, 2008; Hogg, 2011) .
For crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel within the jurisdiction of the host state (e.g. civilian UN staff), it is usually not possible for the host state to undertake investigation and prosecution. Peacekeeping missions operate in climates of armed conflict or post-conflict, in states or regions where there is little to no rule of law, and the law and order structure has collapsed.
With this apparent lack of willingness or ability of states to prosecute their peacekeeping personnel for criminal conduct, there is a need to consider another forum for prosecution. Should the crimes amount to international crimes, a potential forum is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is a court of last resort, available to 4 prosecute international crimes when states are unwilling or unable to do so. 11 There are many jurisdictional concerns to address when determining the potential of the ICC as a forum in which to prosecute peacekeeping personnel. This article will assume that preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC under Article 12 and issues of admissibility under Article 17 of the Rome Statute are met, and will examine some of the substantive law complications that may arise.
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The possibility of a crime by a peacekeeper falling within the definition of genocide will not be addressed, as it is considered highly unlikely that a peacekeeper will engage in genocide. This is based on two premises, the first being that peacekeeping personnel seldom find themselves located in the region of genocide-although this may occur, such as the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the African-Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). 13 The second and principal reason is that genocide requires a mental element of specific intent (Schabas, 2001 ) to destroy a group in whole or in part, the dolus specialis (Cassese, 2002b (Cassese, , 2008 Schabas, 2008; Werle, 2009: 274-281 ).
14 It is unlikely that a peacekeeper would have this intent; given the lack of connection a peacekeeper would have with the group in question-there is no history for a peacekeeper to have developed a discriminatory hatred of a group to the extent of forming intent to destroy that group in whole or in part. Genocidal situations exist in circumstances of years of inter-group animosity, discrimination and hatred, for example the years of 'Aryan race' domination intention of Hitler before and during World War II (Triffterer, 11 However, it is important to note that this is not necessarily the case with war crimes, as a single occurrence of a war crime is still considered an international crime. Yet a war crime is still considered an international crime because, along with genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression, a war crime shocks the conscience of humanity, committed against the world community as a whole, constituting a threat to international peace and security (Bassiouni, 2003: 119, 121 16 The chapeau elements of the crimes under the Rome Statute are those elements that apply to all crimes in that category (genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity). Therefore, in addition to the individual elements of the crime (e.g. the killing of a person for the crime of murder), the chapeau elements, which demonstrate organised, mass violence, must also exist and be proven. It is these elements that render the crimes 'international', in contrast with 'ordinary' domestic crimes. See e.g. (Werle, 2009: 141, ¶ 375 care that all United Nations peacekeeping personnel owe to the local population'.
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Criminal behaviour conducted by peacekeepers also creates problems with the potential success of a mission. Cooperation with and support of the local population are vital elements of a peace support mission, and 'the sexual exploitation scandals… have created additional distrust among the local population towards male peacekeepers' (Martin, 2005: 7) . Acceptable conduct must be exercised by mission personnel at all times to ensure the best possible relations with local communities, which in turn contributes towards the effectiveness of the mission (McCoubrey and White, 1996: 177) . 20 Misconduct by members of a mission may also affect morale and effectiveness of the mission units. A vital aspect of a military force is its cohesiveness, obtained through values such as trust and heightened through camaraderie and high morale (Sagala, 2006: 59) . 21 Negative behaviour by troops, as well as negative assertions and attitudes towards the mission from both within and without the operation reduce the ability of troops to function effectively together (Sagala, 2006) .
Thus criminal conduct by mission personnel can affect international peace and security through jeopardising the mission itself. This demonstrates the importance of ensuring accountability for such conduct, and validates the ICC as an appropriate forum in which to consider the prosecution of peacekeeping personnel for international crimes.
Crimes against humanity
There are two chapeau elements of a crime against humanity, which must be proven in addition to the individual elements of crimes. These chapeau elements are likely to be the principal reason why it would be very difficult to charge a peacekeeper with crimes against humanity. The chapeau elements concern the context of the crimes committed.
Unlike war crimes, what is not required is a nexus with armed conflict (Cassese, 2002a: 356; Meron, 1999: 49) . The removal of this nexus is a departure from the 7 definition of crimes against humanity under the Nuremberg Tribunal Statute (McCormack and Robertson, 1999: 652-3) . Such as nexus was not included in the definition of crimes against humanity of the ad hoc tribunals. 22 The lack of a nexus to armed conflict has been considered by the ICTY as to be the current formulation of customary international law, 23 and that is reflected in the Rome Statute (Rückert and Witschel, 2001: 71; von Hebel and Robinson, 1999: 92-3) . Rather than associating them with armed conflict, crimes against humanity may be viewed as a violation of human rights on a massive scale (Cassese, 2008: 99) .
Widespread or systematic attack direct against civilian population
The first chapeau element of crimes against humanity is the crime is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The words 'widespread' and 'systematic' are disjunctive, meaning that the crime must be committed as part of either a widespread attack or a systematic attack directed against a civilian population (Cassese, 2002a (Cassese, : 366, 2008 Dixon and Hall, 2008: 176-8; Meron, 1999: 50; Robinson, 2001: 63; von Hebel and Robinson, 1999: 94-5) . 24 'Widespread' is not a reference to geographical location, but to the number of victims (Dixon and Hall, 2008: 178 (Marston Danner, 2001: 474) . 27 However, under Art. 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, the attack must be 'pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack'. The Court has interpreted this to mean that while the policy does not have to be explicitly defined, the attack 'must… be thoroughly organised and follow a regular pattern', and 'also be conducted in furtherance of a common policy involving public or private resources '. 28 It is only the attack that must be widespread or systematic. 29 The criminal behaviour of the accused may be a single act or limited number of acts occurring in the context of the attack against a civilian population, and cannot be isolated, limited or random. 30 The targeted civilian population must also be specified. In the RUF Case, the SCSL examined whether the killing of peacekeeping personnel fell within the scope of crimes against humanity. Trial Chamber I held that 'the attacks against UNAMSIL personnel were geographically and temporally removed from the crimes against civilians' found proven under other charges in the case. 31 It was found that the peacekeeping personnel were not killed in connection with these other crimes or further crimes against civilians. 9 civilians of Sierra Leone-they were civilian peacekeeping personnel, but not the civilian population that was the target of the widespread or systematic attack. 32 Thus, despite the fact that the peacekeeping personnel were held to be civilians, the Trial Chamber held that the attacks were 'distinct from and did not form part of the widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population of Sierra Leone'.
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Whether a crime committed by a peacekeeper was part of a widespread or systematic attack would depend upon the circumstances in which the crime was committed. 34 If widespread or systematic crimes are ongoing, then a crime committed by a peacekeeper could be seen to be part of that attack on the civilian population. It is highly unlikely that a peacekeeper would intend their crime to be part of the attack, but it would certainly be committed as part of the attack if that attack is extant. 35 It is also unlikely that a peacekeeper would commit a crime against humanity. This is due to the fact that peacekeeping missions do not generally take place in the context of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. This does not mean they cannot take place in such a context: Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID) are examples of missions that were or are located in territories experiencing widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian population. However the greatest difficulty in determining a crime by a peacekeeper to constitute a crime against humanity lies in the fact that crimes by peacekeeping personnel 'tend to be isolated and sporadic acts of military indiscipline or indifference', rather than part of a widespread or systematic attack (Maogoto, 2000: 74) .
In the instance of a mission located in a post-conflict territory no longer experiencing a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, a crime committed by a peacekeeper could not be considered a crime against humanity, because it would not fulfil the first chapeau element. Unlike the definition of war crimes, in which a war crime is committed in the context of and associated with an armed conflict, a crime against humanity must be committed as part of the widespread or systematic attack. This 32 Ibid. ¶ ¶ 1953-4. 33 Ibid. ¶ 1953. 34 The attack does not have to be a military attack. Elements of Crimes Art. 7 Introduction ¶ 3; (Robinson, 2001: 74) . 35 Elements of crimes against humanity, infra.
difference in wording demonstrates that the war crimes nexus with armed conflict is broader than the crimes against humanity nexus with an attack. A crime committed by a peacekeeper would have to be analysed in its context, and an isolated incident would not amount to a crime against humanity (Cassese, 2002a: 361) . A crime committed after the cessation of the widespread or systematic attack does not constitute a crime against humanity (depending on the circumstances, it may constitute a war crime), because the emphasis of the crime would then be on the victim as an individual, rather than the victim as part of a collective, which is the essence of a crime against humanity. 36 The victim would not be chosen because of their 'membership of a targeted civilian population', and therefore the crime committed would constitute an isolated incident, but not a crime against humanity. 
Knowledge of or intention that conduct was part of widespread or systematic attack
The second chapeau element of crimes against humanity is that the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population (von Hebel and Robinson, 1999: 98) .
Knowledge of the attack does not require 'proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organisation' (Cassese, 2008: 115; Robinson, 2001: 72) . 38 Indeed the majority of peacekeeping personnel would not be aware of the details of a plan or policy of a widespread or systematic attack, as they would not be interacting directly with those who were organising the plan or policy. However it is something that those in superior positions within the mission may well be aware of, given their role in interacting directly with any leaders or commanders of parties to the conflict or other relevant groups. This was the case for General Dallaire in Rwanda prior to and following the commencement 36 Tadic, Trial Judgment, supra note 23, ¶ 644. What the perpetrator must know are the factual circumstances-that there is an attack on a civilian population, and that his/her acts formed part of that attack (Cassese, 2002a: 365) . 40 The perpetrator's knowledge of the attack and awareness that his/her conduct formed part of that attack can be determined from the contextual circumstances, such as the accused's position in the military hierarchy, his presence at the scene of the crimes, and the general historical and political environment in which the acts occurred. 41 The identification of such knowledge would be similar to the knowledge of armed conflict, and would be ascertained from the context of the commission of the crimes as well as the context (including the mandate) of the peace operation itself. The commission of crimes against humanity, an attack on a civilian population, would be the reason behind the decision of the Security Council to establish a peace mission, and therefore the very reason personnel are present in that territory. Personnel would be made aware of the situation on the ground, and the general historical and political environment, thus making it very difficult to argue they had no knowledge of an attack on a civilian population and that their act was part of that widespread or systematic attack.
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The requirement of knowledge or intention is disjunctive, indicating that a perpetrator may commit a crime without the intention that such conduct be part of the widespread or systematic attack. 43 However, should they have knowledge of the attack, even without that specific intent, the perpetrator will still be found guilty of committing a crime against humanity if their crime is committed in the context of the attack. Robinson, 1999) . 45 It should be perceived as a guideline rather than a requirement (von Hebel and Robinson, 1999: 124) . Therefore a single occurrence of a war crime is sufficient for the ICC to establish jurisdiction. 46 The expression 'in particular' indicates that the Court will have jurisdiction over all war crimes, but especially when committed as part of a plan or policy or large-scale commission, as such large-scale or policy commission is a significant factor in defining crimes as international, at which point they amount to a threat to international peace and security. However, the fact that this is not a requirement will enable the Court to prosecute single war crimes, or war crimes not 13 committed as part of a plan or policy or on a large-scale, and this will broaden the scope of potential crimes the Court can prosecute. In terms of crimes committed by peacekeepers, it has been shown above the difficulty that will arise in proving a peacekeeper's crime to be a crime against humanity due to the necessity for the crime to be part of a widespread or systematic attack. A war crime avoids any similar requirement, and thus it will be far more likely that a crime by a peacekeeper is classified as a war crime.
With regard to the number of victims (large-scale commission), the ICTR has distinguished the number of victims as an element specific to crimes against humanity only. In Semanza, 47 the ICTR held that the number of victims was an integral element of a crime against humanity, but not of genocide. The Chamber held that genocide was a crime with 'no numeric minimum of victims', but that the number of victims could be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing. 48 The same principle should apply to war crimes, given that it is not a requirement under the Rome Statute that a war crime be committed as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
It is unlikely that crimes such as sexual exploitation by peacekeeping personnel will be committed as part of a plan or policy, although in some circumstances it could be argued that there is a plan to commit these crimes. Such circumstances would include the involvement of multiple peacekeeping personnel in the trafficking and sexual slavery of women, of peacekeeping personnel who engage in protection of brothel owners in order to be able to make use of the brothel's services, or of peacekeeping personnel in gold smuggling or weapons trading (2004b; Plaut, 2008) . While this would also be an issue with regards to the category of criminal responsibility (e.g. it may be viewed as joint commission 49 ), the context of the commission of the crime(s) can also be used to argue the existence of a plan to commit the crime(s).
While crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel may be isolated incidents, they can be placed in the broader context, and thus be committed as part of a large-scale 47 Semanza, Trial Judgment, 15 May 2003. 48 Ibid. In Krstić, Trial Judgment, supra note 13, the ICTY also referred to the number of victims as a factor in assessing the gravity of crimes committed, for sentencing; ¶ 702. commission of war crimes. This will be the case if other crimes committed within the relevant territory are taken into account, as the armed conflict in the territory within which the peacekeeping personnel are situated is the context of crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel. The cessation of hostilities does not necessarily mean the end of the application of international humanitarian law, and thus does not mean the end of a situation of armed conflict. Thus, even crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel arriving after the cessation of hostilities can still be considered to be associated with the armed conflict, and therefore part of any large-scale commission of crimes that may have occurred during such conflict.
Nexus with armed conflict
To qualify as a war crime, conduct must be associated with the armed conflict, and the perpetrator needs to commit the crime in the context of an armed conflict and be aware of the existence of such conflict (Bothe, 2002: 388-9) . 50 Reference may be made to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. Armed conflict was defined by the ICTY in Tadic   as existing whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. 
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The Tribunal's Appeals Chamber found it to be 'sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict'.
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The association with armed conflict requirement of war crimes was also broadly interpreted by the ICTY in the Foca case:
[T]he criterion of a nexus with the armed conflict under Article 3 of the Statute does not require that the offences be directly committed whilst fighting is actually taking place, or at the scene of combat.
Humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole of the territory under the control of one of the parties, whether or not actual combat continues at the place where the events in question took place.
It is therefore sufficient that the crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict. The requirement that the act be closely related to the armed conflict is satisfied if, as in the present case, the crimes are committed in the aftermath of the fighting, and until the cessation of combat activities in a certain region, and are committed in furtherance or take advantage of the situation created by the fighting.
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The phrase 'in the context of' is to be interpreted in 'very general geographical and temporal terms', following the direction of the ICTY, and 'associated with' demonstrates the nexus with the armed conflict (Dörmann et al., 2001: 121) . The ICC has applied the broad interpretation, requiring that 'the armed conflict must play a substantial role in the perpetrator's decision, in his or her ability to commit the crime or in the manner in which the conduct was ultimately committed'. 54 However, the 'armed conflict need not be considered the ultimate reason for the conduct and the conduct need not have taken place in the midst of battle'.
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Crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel may fall within this expansive interpretation. Peace support operations are located in places experiencing on-going conflict, or in a post-conflict situation. Their very presence is related to the armed conflict; that is precisely the reason the mission is in that territory. 56 The commission of a crime such as sexual exploitation takes advantage of the situation created by the fighting, as the conflict has created a society in which women are left with no choice but to sell their bodies in order to survive. Weapons trading can flourish only due to parties engaging in armed conflict. Thus, it can be argued that these crimes are committed in the context of an armed conflict, and are associated with an armed conflict, even if hostilities have ceased.
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Unfortunately, such an application to UN missions is not so simple, and it may be the case that the Court finds that the crime(s) in question do not have a nexus to armed conflict because it was committed after the cessation of hostilities-or even later in time, after the conclusion of peace, and thus concludes there is no jurisdiction under Article 8.
There is much debate on the issue of peacekeeping personnel involvement in armed conflict, and whether and when they are considered to be combatants engaging in armed conflict or civilians. 58 There is no clear legal stance as to the application of IHL (Bialke, 2001; Faite and Grenier, 2004; Greenwood, 1998; Murphy, 2003; Palwankar, 1993) ; that is, the exact circumstances when peacekeeping personnel are considered to be engaging in armed conflict (2004a: 208-9 57 It is not 'necessary that the crime alleged takes place during combat, that it be part of a policy or of a practice officially endorsed or tolerated by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual furtherance of a policy associated with the conduct of war or in the actual interest of a party to the conflict';
Tadic, Trial Judgment, supra note 23, ¶ 573.
The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.
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From this, it can be deduced that whether IHL is applicable will depend on the individual mandate of the operation, and this may assist in interpreting whether the circumstances in which the crime is committed amounts to armed conflict. In addition to the mandate, the SCSL has suggested other elements that may assist in defining the situation:
the specific operational mandates, the role and practices actually adopted by the peacekeeping mission during the particular conflict, their rules of engagement and operational orders, the nature of the arms and equipment used by the peacekeeping force, the interaction between the peacekeeping force and the parties involved in the conflict, any use of force between the peacekeeping force and the parties in the conflict, the nature and frequency of such force and the conduct of the alleged victim(s) and their fellow personnel.
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The RUF Case Trial Chamber held that 'peacekeeping personnel are considered to be civilians only insofar as… they do not take direct part in the hostilities' (Sivakumaran, 2010 (Sivakumaran, : 1026 . 61 (Shraga, 2000: 408-9) ; (Tittemore, 1997: 93) ; (McCoubrey and White, 1996: 161-2) ; (Rowe, 2000: 53) .
60 RUF Case, supra note 15, ¶ 234. See also (Sivakumaran, 2010 (Sivakumaran, : 1026 18 provided that it is limited to such use, would not alter or diminish the protection afforded to peacekeeping personnel'.
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Whether or not IHL is applicable to peacekeeping personnel is not be relevant if it is the peacekeeper committing a war crime, as a war crime may be committed by a combatant or a civilian (Cassese, 2008: 82-3; Dinstein, 2010: 264; Dörmann et al., 2001: 119) . A war crime must be committed in the context of and be associated with an armed conflict, but the perpetrator does not have to be engaged as a combatant in the armed conflict (Dörmann, 2002: 391-3; Zimmerman, 2008: 488) . 63 The applicability of IHL could simply be used to assist in determining armed conflict status.
A problem that would arise is whether to charge a peacekeeper with a war crime committed in international or non-international armed conflict, and again there is no clear rule on this (Faite and Grenier, 2004: 11; Greenwood, 1998: 8-9) . 64 Clearly if the mission is mandated to exist because of an armed conflict between two states, then the armed conflict is international. 65 However, most missions are located in one state, due to internal armed conflict, usually between government and rebel or revolutionary forces (e.g. UN
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo MONUC, UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti MINUSTAH). One argument is that such a conflict automatically becomes international with the involvement of a multi-national peacekeeping force (Faite and Grenier, 2004: 11; Kirsch, 1995: 105) . The opposite claim is that an armed conflict is only international if it involves hostilities between two states; 66 and a UN force is not a state (Greenwood, 1998: 15) . Secondly, it is determined that IHL applies to UN forces when they are engaged in hostilities. While it is true that IHL has been determined to apply in both international and non-international armed conflicts, and there is support for the elimination of a distinction between the two (Cassese, 2008: 96; Crawford, 2007) , 75 a distinction does still exist between international and non-international armed conflict, particularly with regard to IHL. The application of IHL to UN forces demonstrates that there is consideration of the UN forces as engaging in international armed conflict (Greenwood, 1998: 25) . Even if the UN forces are fighting at the request of a government, it cannot be said that they are engaging in non-international armed conflict because they do not form part of the government (or other) forces. UN forces are independent of all parties to any armed conflict; impartiality is one of the basic principles of peacekeeping. 76 Therefore, a UN force is an international force which may become party to the conflict upon engagement in hostilities against any party to the conflict-and therefore the armed conflict becomes international.
The ICTY has held that an internal armed conflict 'may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal the UN applying minimum standards whereas ECOMOG did not; (Zwanenburg, 1999: 756) . 75 Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 51, ¶ ¶ 97-98. 
Knowledge of existence of armed conflict and status of victim
Finally, under Article 8, a perpetrator of a war crime must be aware of the existence of an armed conflict. The knowledge required is simply that of the existence of an armed conflict, and the perpetrator is not required to have any knowledge of the category of armed conflict (international or non-international) or the circumstances establishing the category of armed conflict (Bothe, 2002: 389; Dörmann et al., 2001: 122) . It would be extraordinarily difficult for a peacekeeper to claim they were not aware of the existence of an armed conflict within the territory in which they are stationed. As stated above, the ultimate reason for the presence of a peace support operation within any territory is a 87 For example, UNMIK, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, both a civil and military presence in Kosovo; Security Council Resolution 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999). Rowe, however, asserts that it is 'unrealistic… to argue that the armed forces comprising the multinational force are in 'occupation' of the territory on which they are based'; (Rowe, 2006: 230) . Yet during occupation, 'territory must be placed under the actual authority of the… army' and 'the authority of the legitimate authority See also Rowe's discussion in (Rowe, 2000: 54-6 Those under Arts. 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(c). 91 The perpetrator does not have to be aware 'of the protected status under the Geneva Conventions per se, which would be a question of law'-the emphasis is on the factual circumstances; (Dörmann et al., 2001: 118-9); (Bothe, 2002: 390 
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person is a broad one, and will cover a prisoner of war, but also any person located in the territory in which armed conflict is taking place and in general which is under the control of a party to the conflict.
Again, the situation in which the mission is conducted will provide clear evidence of a person's non-combatant status. The relevant facts relating to each victim should be examined to ascertain whether, 'in each individual's circumstances, that person was actively involved in hostilities at the relevant time'. 96 A peacekeeper would have trouble proving that they were not aware of the protected status of a young girl, or a woman working in a brothel, located within the territory under control of one or more parties involved in the armed conflict. Clearly the victims of sexual exploitation by peacekeeping personnel are not taking direct part in hostilities and therefore are not combatants (Melzer, 2009) . 97 Encompassed within this definition would also be former members of an armed force who have laid down their arms and are no longer taking part in hostilities (Zimmerman, 2008: 488 For both categories of crimes, the contextual elements will be vital. The mandate of the mission, the Rules of Engagement, 99 and the situation on the ground will all require analysis to determine whether there is a systematic or widespread attack, or an armed conflict. The principal complication will be whether a peacekeeper's crime can be linked to the attack or armed conflict. As has been demonstrated, there are potential situations in which these elements can be proven. The concept may present a challenge, but in absence of states taking prosecutorial action, peacekeeping personnel could be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity before the ICC.
